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Abstract Diagnostic reasoning, defined as the ability to
infer unobserved causes based on the observation of their
effects, is a central cognitive competency of humans. Yet,
little is known about diagnostic reasoning in non-human
primates, and what we know is largely restricted to the
Great Apes. To track the evolutionary history of these skills
within primates, we investigated long-tailed macaques’
understanding of the significance of inclinations of covers
of hidden food as diagnostic indicators for the presence of
an object located underneath. Subjects were confronted
with choices between different objects that might cover
food items. Based on their physical characteristics, the
shape and orientation of the covers did or did not reveal the
location of a hidden reward. For instance, hiding the reward
under a solid board led to its inclination, whereas a hollow
cup remained unaltered. Thus, the type of cover and the
occurrence or absence of a change in their appearance could
potentially be used to reason diagnostically about the
location of the reward. In several experiments, the maca-
ques were confronted with a varying number of covers and
their performance was dependent on the level of complexity
and on the type of change of the covers’ orientation. The
macaques could use a board’s inclination to detect the
reward, but failed to do so if the lack of inclination was
indicative of an alternative hiding place. We suggest that
the monkeys’ performance is based on a rudimentary
understanding of causality, but find no good evidence for
sophisticated diagnostic reasoning in this particular domain.
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Introduction
On my way to the office on a stormy autumn day, I observe
the trees bending and the leaves whirling around. Naturally
and without giving it much thought, I am aware that it is
the wind that causes the movement of the trees and not the
trees that cause the wind. In other words, I understand the
causal relationship and can use this knowledge to infer the
effect of wind on a treeless sandy beach. We think about
such causal relationships regularly in our everyday life; it is
an important mechanism allowing us to make sense of our
world (Waldmann and Hagmayer 2013). However, if and
to what degree non-human animals also reason about
causes and effects is not clear and the centre of some fierce
debates (see, for example, Blaisdell and Waldmann 2012;
Penn and Povinelli 2007; Waldmann et al. 2012). While the
precise nature of causal reasoning remains disputed, there
is increasing evidence that at least primates and corvids
may understand the causally relevant features of objects
(e.g., Hanus and Call 2011; O’Connell and Dunbar 2005;
Taylor et al. 2011; Visalberghi et al. 2009) and may learn
discriminations based on causal cues faster than those
based on arbitrary factors (Hanus and Call 2011).
Understanding cause–effect relationships lays the
groundwork from which one can reason about one factor if
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observing the other factor. Importantly, such causal rea-
soning works in two directions: one can identify the effect
of a given cause (predictive reasoning), but also the cause
of an observed effect (diagnostic reasoning). This distinc-
tion between predictive and diagnostic reasoning has been
investigated in a number of studies in human psychology
(Fernbach et al. 2011; Waldmann 2000) but not in the
animal cognition literature. Here, both directions are usu-
ally subsumed under ‘‘causal reasoning’’.
The first reports about diagnostic reasoning (according
to our definition) in non-humans comes from work by
Premack and Premack (1994). In one of their experiments,
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) saw an experimenter hiding
two different types of food under two containers. Then, an
experimenter first removed, unseen by the chimpanzees,
one of the two fruits before eating it in plain sight of the
animals. Subsequently, the subjects were allowed to
approach the containers. One of four chimpanzees appar-
ently detected the underlying causation that the experi-
menter had eaten, say, the apple, because he had removed it
from the container; as a consequence, this chimpanzee then
approached the other container to obtain the remaining fruit
(see also Call 2006 and Mikolasch et al. 2011 for similar
results with chimpanzees and Grey parrots Psittacus
erithacus). One of the difficulties for the subjects in these
studies is that they have to infer first that the presentation of
the food means that this food has been removed from its
hiding place; in a second step, they have to infer that they
have to choose the alternative container to obtain the other
reward. Similar two-step inferences are involved in the
‘‘shaking’’ task. Here, apes and Grey parrots seem to
understand that (a) rattling noises emitted during the
shaking of a bowl are indicative for the presence of a
reward in this bowl (first inference) and that (b) the absence
of noise is indicative for the absence of a reward, and
therefore, the other bowl must be chosen (second inference;
e.g., Call 2004; Schloegl et al. 2012). Capuchin monkeys
(Cebus apella) do not succeed instantaneously in this task,
but may come to understand this relationship through
experience (e.g., Heimbauer et al. 2012; Sabbatini and
Visalberghi 2008; see also Maille and Roeder 2012 for
tentative evidence in lemurs).
Using a different approach, Call (2007) was interested in
Great Apes’ knowledge about the effect objects can have
on the spatial orientation of other objects. To illustrate this,
imagine an apple hidden under a cardboard. Because of the
influence of the apple on the orientation of the board, it
would not be lying flat on the ground but would be
inclined. Thus, understanding that the inclination is caused
by the apple would allow an observer to reason diagnos-
tically about the location of the apple. Similarly, the
absence of an inclination would be indicative of the pres-
ence of the apple in a different location. In his study, Call
confronted his subjects first with a food reward hidden
underneath one of two wooden boards, which was inclined.
The results demonstrated that apes use the inclination of
the board as an indicator for the presence of the reward
underneath the board. Notably, in a later task, the apes first
saw that a large piece of a less preferred food item and a
smaller piece of a more preferred food item were to be
hidden; after the hiding, however, the subjects chose
against their food preference and selected the board with
the stronger inclination. This preference was particularly
pronounced in bonobos (Pan paniscus) and gorillas (Gor-
illa gorilla), but was less obvious in orang utans (Pongo
sp.). Taken together, the apes were able to use the obser-
vation of an effect (presence of an inclination) to detect its
cause (presence of the food), but their abilities were lim-
ited: They could not use the strength of the inclination to
determine which food had been hidden where, but pre-
ferred the strongest inclination instead (Call 2007). Inter-
estingly, as in the apes, human children’s physical
knowledge analogously develops gradually and context
specifically (e.g., Baillargeon 1991, 2004).
To assess the evolution of human cognition, it is
important to trace the origin of a variety of cognitive
abilities through the primate lineage (MacLean et al. 2012).
In recent years, several approaches have been taken to
assess the cognitive abilities of a variety of species for
cross-species comparisons (e.g., Amici et al. 2008, 2010;
Herrmann et al. 2007; Hill et al. 2011). One interesting
finding is that monkeys performed more similar to the
Great Apes than expected in a wide set of tasks (e.g., Amici
et al. 2010; Herrmann et al. 2007; Schmitt et al. 2012).
Thus, the differences in brain size between apes and
monkeys may not translate into cognitive differences in all
tasks but in superior performances of apes in some selected
cognitive tasks only (e.g., mirror self-recognition or per-
spective taking; Anderson and Gallup 2011; Hare et al.
2000, 2003). In a recent study applying the primate cog-
nition test battery (PCTB as developed by Herrmann et al.
2007), long-tailed macaques Macaca fascicularis showed
some indication for diagnostic understanding about the
effects objects can have on other objects: When the mon-
keys had to choose between an inclined board and a board
lying flat on the ground, with food hidden under the
inclined board, they performed similarly to the Great Apes
by choosing the board with the reward underneath (Schmitt
et al. 2012). One drawback of such large-scale comparisons
using a wide variety of tasks is, however, that they rarely
tap into the cognitive mechanisms by which the subjects’
performances are achieved. For instance, Schmitt et al.
(2012) conducted six trials only and did not include control
conditions. Thus, from their results, we can conclude that
monkeys indeed prefer inclined boards; however, it did not
become clear if the monkeys chose the inclined board
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because it was perceptually more salient than the flat board,
or if they understood that something had caused the
inclination. And if the monkeys did understand the
underlying causality, would they also be able to use this
knowledge to reason diagnostically?
To answer these questions, we designed a new set of
tasks for which we made use of the monkeys’ previous
experiences with inclined boards. Thus, we were not
interested if the monkeys would choose inclined boards (as
this was already known), but we were interested in
exploring in-depth the cognitive mechanisms and the
monkeys’ understanding of causality. To get information
about the cognitive mechanisms, we employed a series of
tasks of decreasing complexity (see Seed et al. 2012, for a
similar approach). In the initial study, we presented two of
three potentially available objects on each trial and each
object would be differently influenced by a food reward
placed underneath (e.g., a cup, a board and a board resting
on a wooden block). Thus, this task required the subjects to
track three different objects and base their decision where
to expect the reward on the type of objects and their initial
and final orientation. In the following studies, we sequen-
tially removed potentially confounding or distracting fac-
tors from this basic design to titrate the boundary
conditions of long-tailed macaques’ understanding of
causality and diagnostic reasoning. We predicted that if the
salience of the inclination explains the monkeys’ choices,
they should prefer inclined boards regardless of whether or
not the inclination is indicative of the reward. If they
understand the causality, however, they should choose the
inclined board only if the orientation had changed due to
the hiding of a reward. Likewise, they should not prefer a
solid object with an inclined surface, as this inclination is
an inherent feature of the object but not diagnostic for a
reward (see also Call 2007). Finally, if the underlying
choice mechanism is based on fully developed diagnostic
reasoning, the macaques should apply this skill flexibly and
generalise it to other cause–effect relationships, for
instance if a reward is hidden under a hollow cup instead of
a board.
Experiment 1: differential influences of a reward
on three different objects
Methods
Subjects and housing
We tested seven long-tailed macaques (three males), which
were housed in a group of 31 individuals at the German
Primate Center, Go¨ttingen. At the time of testing, the
subjects were between 2 and 9 years old (mean age:
4.1 years; Table 1). The only criterion to include subjects
in this and the subsequent experiments was their willing-
ness to participate in the tasks. Housing facilities consisted
of indoor (25 m2) and outdoor areas (141 m2), and subjects
were tested individually in a small cage (42 9 58 9 57 cm
(b 9 l 9 h) connected to a testing compartment (approx.
1 m2, 2.3 m high) inside their familiar indoor area. The
subjects were free to leave the cage and enter the testing
compartment at any time during testing. Tests were con-
ducted once per day and participation was voluntary, that
is, dependent on the monkeys’ willingness to enter the test
compartment and the cage. Water was available ad libitum,
and monkeys were not food deprived. All subjects had
participated in the ‘‘Shape’’ task of the PCTB (Schmitt
et al. 2012).
General procedure
The monkeys saw the setup through a transparent Plexiglas
pane attached to the front side of the cage. Objects were
presented on a sliding platform made of grey polyvinyl-
chloride (80 9 27 cm) affixed to the Plexiglas pane. Three
small holes (diameter: 1 cm; distance between the holes:
15.5 cm) were drilled into the pane, and objects were
positioned in front of the left and right hole. During the
presentation of the setup, the platform was pushed back-
ward to a distance of approx. 6 cm between the pane and
the front edge of the platform. After the presentation, the
platform was pushed forward towards the pane and the
subjects made a choice by sticking a finger through the hole
in front of an object. In a few cases, the monkeys’ choices
were not unequivocal, as they put a finger in each of the
two holes or switched rapidly between the two holes. In
these cases, the experimenter pulled back the platform,
waited a few seconds and pushed the platform forward
again. The experimenter sat opposite of the monkey in
reaching distance of the platform.
Table 1 Subjects and participation in the experiments
Subject Age (years) Sex Participation in experiment
1 2 3 4
Ismael 3 # 4 4 4
Maja 4 $ 4 4 4 4
Paule 4 # 4
Popeye 4 # 4 4
Selina 3 $ 4 4 4 4
Sophie 2 $ 4 4 4 4
Sunny 9 $ 4 4 4 4
Lennie 2 # 4 4 4
Samson 3 # 4 4 4
Sally 4 $ 4 4
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Choice training
Even though the subjects had participated in choice tasks
before, we conducted training sessions to ensure that the
monkeys were accustomed to choosing between one of two
objects. The experimenter placed a food reward (pieces of
fresh banana, grape, apple, pear or plum or pieces of dried
plum or apricot, depending on availability and individual
preferences) on the platform in front of one of the two outer
holes; he then simultaneously positioned two identically
looking white cups (10 cm in height and 6.5 cm in diam-
eter) on the platform, with one of the two cups covering the
food. The other cup was placed in front of the other outer
hole. The platform was pushed towards the monkey, and
the animal could indicate its choice. The experimenter
remained seated behind the platform with the hands resting
in his lap and the face looking straight ahead, neither
looking directly at the setup nor the monkey. If the correct
cup was chosen, the experimenter handed the food to the
animal. If not, the reward was removed from the cup,
shown to the monkey and discarded. The food was hidden
randomly on the left or on the right side, with the restric-
tion that the food was not on the same side for more than
three consecutive trials. A session lasted for 12 trials and
because the monkeys were familiar with choice procedures,
we advanced them to testing if they chose the baited cup on
at least eleven of 12 trials of a single session (P = 0.006 in
a two-tailed binomial test).
Testing
In the actual tests, a food reward was hidden underneath
one of two different objects behind an opaque screen
(50 9 20 cm). In total, three different types of covering
objects were available, but only two were presented on
each trial. As objects we used (a) a plastic cup (5 cm in
diameter and 4 cm in height) laminated with brown tape,
(b) a rectangular piece of cardboard (13 9 10 cm), also
laminated with brown tape and (c) an identical piece of
cardboard, resting on a square wooden block (edge length:
2 cm); the monkeys saw that the wooden block caused the
inclination of the cardboard. In the following, we will refer
to these three objects as ‘‘cup’’, ‘‘flat board’’ and ‘‘pre-
inclined board’’, describing their appearance prior to the
hiding of the reward.
At the start of each trial, two of these objects were put
on the platform in full view of the subjects, with the
position of the objects (left/right) randomised. The exper-
imenter lifted the objects repeatedly to demonstrate that no
food was present; thereby, the subjects could clearly see
that the inclined board was resting on the wooden block
only. Next, the experimenter put the screen between the
subjects and the setup, took a piece of food out of a food
bowl and lifted his hand above the screen to show the
reward to the subject. He then lowered his hand behind the
screen and manipulated first the object on the left side and
then the object on the right side. Manipulations either
consisted of hiding the food underneath the object or only
touching and re-arranging it. Finally, the experimenter
lifted his hand again, opened his palm to demonstrate the
food is no longer in his hand, removed the screen and
pushed the platform towards the subjects, which were then
allowed to make a choice. The experimenter lifted the
selected object and, if the subjects had made a correct
choice, he handed the reward to the monkey. Otherwise, he
lifted the other object to reveal the location of the reward
and removed it. The objects were then re-arranged and the
next trial started. The location of the reward was ran-
domised with the stipulation that the same object or the
same side was not rewarded for more than three consecu-
tive trials.
In total, we administered five different conditions (see
Fig. 1):
Condition A (control): The pre-inclined board and the
cup were presented. In half of the trials, the food was
hidden underneath the board, in the other half of the trials
underneath the cup. Because hiding of the food did not
Fig. 1 Illustrations of the five different conditions presented in
Experiment 1, shown from the perspective of the monkeys. The
objects are shown as orientated after the hiding of the reward. In
Condition A, the reward was under each of the two objects in 50 % of
the trials. In Condition B, the reward was under the board that had
been flat before the hiding (the board on the right side in this
example). In Condition C, the reward was under the inclined board
that rests on a wooden block. In condition D, the reward was under
the board and in Condition E, it was under the cup
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change the orientation of any of the two objects, subjects
were not expected to be able to detect the location of the
food.
Condition B:The pre-inclined board and the flat board
were presented, and the food was hidden underneath the
flat board; thus, both boards were inclined after the hiding
of the food.
Condition C: As condition B, but the food was hidden
underneath the pre-inclined board; thus, the flat board
remained lying flat on the platform.
Condition D: The flat board and the cup were presented,
and the food was hidden underneath the flat board; thus, the
flat board was inclined after the hiding of the food, whereas
the cup remained unchanged.
Condition E: As in Condition D, but the food was hid-
den underneath the cup; thus, the flat board remained lying
flat on the platform.
We were interested whether the monkeys could use the
change of orientation of the flat board or the absence
thereof to infer the location of the food. Furthermore, we
wanted to assess if the monkeys could differentiate
between causally relevant and irrelevant changes of board
orientation. Therefore, in half of the trials of conditions
B–E, we additionally rotated the flat board by 90. Thus,
we created trials in which
(a) no modifications occurred (no rotation of the flat
board in conditions C and E)
(b) causally irrelevant modifications occurred (rotation
of the flat board in conditions C and E)
(c) causally relevant changes occurred (inclination, but
no rotation of the board in conditions B and D) and
(d) causally relevant and irrelevant changes occurred
(inclination and rotation of the flat board in
conditions B and D).
The same types of reward were used as during the training
sessions. Note that the pieces of food were smaller than the
block underneath the pre-inclined board (approximate size:
1 cm, with some small variation due to the characteristics
of the fruits); this was done to ensure that hiding an
additional piece of food underneath the pre-inclined board
would not alter the inclination of the board; however, as a
consequence, the inclination of the flat board was less steep
than the inclination of the pre-inclined board.
A session lasted for a maximum of 12 trials and if
subjects terminated a session pre-maturely, the missing
trials were run on the next day, up to a maximum of 12
trials per session. For analysis, we formed blocks of 12
consecutive trials each. Subjects received 8 blocks of 12
trials for a total of 96 trials; within a block, conditions B–E
were presented twice each, with four trials of condition A
interspersed. This was done to ensure that food was hidden
an equal amount of times under each object and that the
monkeys would not form preferences for certain objects
because of an increased likelihood of finding food under-
neath a specific object. The order of conditions was ran-
domised. Because of an experimenter error, a few sessions
were terminated after 10 trials. Missing trials were con-
ducted in a different session. Subjects received only 1
session/day.
Analysis
All trials were videotaped for later analysis. A second rater
coded eleven sessions (approx. 20 % of all trials) and the
inter-observer reliability was excellent (98.5 % agreement,
Cohen’s J = 0.967). For the analysis, we scored the per-
centage of correct choices in each condition. We further
measured if the subjects had side biases, that is, a prefer-
ence for the objects to their left or right side.
Most data were normally distributed and consequently
we used parametric statistics whenever appropriate.
Repeated measures ANOVAS with the Holm–Sidak post
hoc procedure were applied to compare performances
between conditions, and one-sample t tests to assess if
group performances within each condition deviated from
chance. Only in one case, the assumption of normality was
not fulfilled and therefore we used a Wilcoxon test instead.
Binomial tests were used to analyse individual perfor-
mances. We used Pearson correlations or Spearman cor-
relations (depending on distribution of the data) to test for
performance changes across blocks. We present exact, two-
tailed p-values throughout, with a = 0.05. Tests were
conducted using SPSS 11.5 and SigmaPlot 11.
Results
Training
Six of the seven monkeys reached the training criterion in
the first session, with five of these monkeys not making any
mistake. One male reached the criterion after three
sessions.
Test
We first assessed whether the monkeys’ performance was
influenced by the causally irrelevant modification (rota-
tion of the flat board by 90) in half of the trials in the
conditions B–E. Therefore, we ran a two-way repeated
measures ANOVA and included ‘‘with or without rota-
tion’’ as a factor. We also included ‘‘condition’’ (B–E), to
assess if an effect of rotation may have been dependent
on the condition. As the flat board was not used in the
control condition A, it was not included in the analysis.
We found performance differences between the conditions
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(F3,18 = 3.376, P = 0.041), but neither an effect of the
90 rotation of the flat board (F1,18 = 0.067, P = 0.805)
nor an interaction between the factors (F3,18 = 0.488,
P = 0.695). Additionally, we ran a one-way repeated
measures ANOVA to assess if the performance differed
between trials in which no modification, only causally
relevant, only causally irrelevant or both types of modi-
fications occurred. This was not the case (F6,18 = 0.209,
P = 0.889). Thus, the causally irrelevant rotation of the
flat board had apparently no influence on the monkeys’
performance, and we subsequently pooled within each
condition the trials with and without the 90 rotation of
the flat board.
Next, we conducted a one-way repeated measures
ANOVA to assess performance differences between all five
conditions. Although we found significant differences
(F4,24 = 3.23, P = 0.03) in the global test, the post hoc
tests all turned out to be non-significant (all Ps C 0.101;
Fig. 2). Contrasting the monkeys’ performance in each
condition with the theoretical chance level of 50 %
revealed chance performance in the control condition A
(one-sample t test: t = 0, df = 6, P [ 0.999) as well as in
the conditions D (flat board and cup, with food hidden
underneath the flat board: t = 1.595, df = 6, P = 0.162)
and E (flat board and cup, with food hidden in the cup:
Wilcoxon test: T?=19, df = 6, P = 0.469). In condition B
(pre-inclined and flat board, food hidden underneath the flat
board) the monkeys had a small, yet significant preference
for the un-baited, pre-inclined board (t = -2.489, df = 6,
P = 0.047), whereas in Condition C (pre-inclined and flat
board, food hidden underneath the pre-inclined board) the
same preference for the pre-inclined board marginally
failed to reach significance (t = 2.228, df = 6, P = 0.067;
Fig. 2).
Visual inspection of Fig. 2 suggests at least a marginally
better performance in conditions C and D, that is, in those
conditions in which only one board was inclined under
which the food was hidden, than in the other conditions.
This effect, however, is driven by the superior performance
of two females who both chose the rewarded object sig-
nificantly above chance in both conditions (binomial tests,
all Ps B 0.021), whereas all other performances by these
and the other monkeys were at chance level (all
Ps C 0.21).
No clear preference for one of the three objects was
detectable (one-way repeated measures ANOVA:
F2,14 = 2.796, P = 0.095), but strong side biases occurred
in six of the seven subjects (binomial tests, all Ps B 0.032).
Interestingly, we found a decrease in choice accuracy in
later blocks (Spearman: N = 8, rs = -0.916, P \ 0.001).
The oldest subject, which was more than twice as old as all
other monkeys (Table 1), did not perform differently than
the other subjects.
Discussion
This first experiment showed that the long-tailed macaques
had considerable problems to detect the location of the
hidden food based on the spatial orientation of the objects
under which the reward could have been hidden. In contrast
to this, the same subjects were successful in a significantly
simpler task in which the reward was hidden underneath
one of two boards, which had both been lying flat on the
ground prior to the hiding of the reward (Schmitt et al.
2012). Whereas the superior performance of the subjects in
that task could have been based on a preference for an
inclined board only, they here had to make several con-
siderations to be successful: they had to take into account
(1) if an object’s spatial orientation would be influenced by
a reward hidden underneath (board vs. cup), (2) if a board
had been inclined prior to the hiding, and (3) if this pre-
inclined board could still be the location of the reward; this
last consideration was furthermore dependent on the type
and orientation of the other object. In other words, the
computational demands of this task may have been too
high. A similar argument had been raised by Call (2007);
(see also Seed et al. 2012), whose apes failed to distinguish
between two inclined boards, one of which was resting
visibly on a wooden block. This possibility is supported by
the success of two of our female subjects in the conditions
in which they could base their choice on the presence of a
Fig. 2 Performance of the monkeys in Experiment 1. Capital letters
below the x axis denote the conditions. The two objects used per
condition are shown below the x axis. The illustration shows the
objects after the hiding of the reward. For conditions B–E, the top
object is rewarded and the lower object is not rewarded. In the control
condition A, each object was rewarded on 50 % of the trials. Boxplots
show median, 25th and 75th quartile, whiskers show 10th and
90th percentiles, dots represent outliers. The solid horizontal line
represents the 50 % chance level, the vertical dotted line separates
control and test conditions. Asterisk shows significant deviation from
chance according to a one-sample t test
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single inclination only. Thus, in principle, some long-tailed
macaques are able to rely on a board’s inclination to detect
the food underneath; however, the majority of the monkeys
failed to do so. Beside the computational demands of the
task, there are several sources of distraction that may have
influenced the other subjects. First, to assess if the monkeys
could distinguish between diagnostically relevant and
irrelevant modifications, we included the irrelevant 90
rotation of the flat board in half of the trials. This may have
distracted the monkeys, even though the lack of an effect of
the rotation renders this possibility unlikely. Second, the
strength of the two inclinations differed, which may have
biased the monkeys towards the pre-inclined board and
may have made it more difficult to distinguish between the
pre-inclined and the flat board. There is tentative support
for this assumption: Even though we did not find an overall
preference for the pre-inclined board, the monkeys’ per-
formance was worst in the condition in which both boards
had been inclined; only in this condition the subjects per-
formed below chance, indicating a weak but detectable bias
towards the stronger inclination. Thus, the long-tailed
macaques may be subjected to the same bias as bonobos
and gorillas (but not orang utans; Call 2007). Finally, most
monkeys showed severe side biases, a common phenome-
non in unsuccessful subjects and may be seen as a fallback
strategy in over-demanding tasks.
Experiment 2: reducing the computational demands—
flat board versus cup
In this experiment, we simplified the task to test if the
computational demands of the first experiment may have
masked the cognitive abilities of the long-tailed macaques.
Therefore, we first excluded the 90 rotation of the flat
board, as this manipulation had been ignored by the
monkeys. Second, we removed the pre-inclined board, as
the occurrence of two inclined boards may have exceed-
ingly increased the task’s complexity. Yet, we continued to
confront the monkeys with the flat board and the cup. Thus,
to solve the tasks, the monkeys would still need to consider




Six of the seven subjects (two males) from Experiment 1
participated, while the third male was not motivated to
enter the test compartment. In addition, two other males (2
and 3 years old) participated (Table 1). Both new subjects
had participated in the study by Schmitt et al. (2012).
General procedure
The general procedure was identical to Experiment 1.
Training
We used a transposition task (e.g., Rooijakkers et al. 2009)
for training. In this task, the monkeys had to track the
movement of a baited cup while simultaneously tracking
the movement of a distractor cup. The idea was to prime
the monkeys to pay attention to the setup and thereby
counteracting their side biases. The monkeys could observe
how one piece of food was hidden underneath one of two
identical white plastic cups (10 cm in height and 6.5 cm in
diameter). Then, the experimenter simultaneously touched
each cup with one hand and executed one of two different
manipulations:
Transposition: the two cups were moved slowly and
simultaneously from their original side of the platform to
the opposite side of the platform, that is, from the left side to
the right side or vice versa. Thereby, each cup replaced the
other cup in its original position. During the movement, the
cups were crossing their paths in the middle of the platform.
No transposition: both cups were moved slowly and
simultaneously to the middle of the platform, but were then
returned to their original position; thus, no crossing of the
paths occurred.
To ensure that the monkeys watched the entire proce-
dure, the manipulations were conducted slowly and the
speed was adjusted to the monkeys’ attention: if a monkey
shifted its attention and looked away from the setup, the
movement was paused and the experimenter called the
monkey’s name. The movement was resumed as soon as
the monkey looked at the setup again. The location of the
food and the order of manipulation were randomised with
the stipulation that neither side was baited for more than
three consecutive trials; similarly, the same manipulation
was not repeated for more than three consecutive trials.
Each session consisted of 12 trials, with each manipu-
lation presented six times. If subjects terminated a session
pre-maturely, the missing trials were conducted on the next
day, up to a maximum of 12 trials per session. For the
analysis, we formed blocks of 12 consecutive trials. To
advance to testing, the monkeys had to choose the baited
cup on at least 10 of the 12 trials for two consecutive
blocks and with no more than one error per manipulation
per block (for each session P = 0.039 in a two-tailed
binomial test).
Testing
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, but to make
it salient that the task differed from the previous one, we
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used new cups and boards. Cups measured 6 cm in dia-
meter and 6 cm in height, boards measured 13 9 13 cm.
All objects were covered by black tape.
We administered four different conditions:
Condition A (control): two cups were presented, and the
reward was hidden randomly underneath one of them.
Because hiding of the food did not change the orientation
of any of the two objects, subjects were not expected to be
able to detect the location of the food.
Condition B: two flat boards were presented; after the
hiding of the reward underneath one of the boards it was
inclined.
Condition C: a flat board and a cup were presented; the
reward was hidden underneath the board causing an incli-
nation of the board.
Condition D: as in condition C, but the reward was
hidden underneath the cup so that the board remained lying
flat on the platform.
A session lasted 12 trials and subjects received 6 blocks
of 12 trials for a total of 72 trials; within a session, each
condition was presented three times, for a total of 18 trials
per condition. The order of conditions was randomised.
Subjects received only 1 session/day.
Analysis
Data were analysed in the same way as in Experiment 1.
Results
Training
The monkeys needed 6.4 ± 4.1 sessions (x ± SD; range
2–14) to reach the training criterion. More errors occurred
in the ‘‘transposition’’ than in the ‘‘no transposition’’ con-
dition (71.9 ± 21.3 % of all errors; x ± SD; paired t test:
t = 2.905, df = 7, P = 0.023).
Test
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant perfor-
mance differences between the conditions (F3,21 = 7.143,
P = 0.002), and post hoc analyses show that the subjects
were significantly more successful in conditions B and C,
in which the reward was hidden underneath an inclined
board, than in the control condition A (Ps B 0.035; Fig. 3);
furthermore, subjects were more successful in condition B
(two boards) than in condition D (one board and one cup,
with the food underneath the cup; P = 0.012). The contrast
between conditions C and D (one board and one cup; in C
the reward is underneath the board, in D it is underneath
the cup) failed to reach significance (P = 0.083),
whereas all other comparisons were non-significant (all
Ps C 0.494). Similarly, when contrasting the performance
within each condition with the hypothetical chance level of
50 %, the monkeys were significantly above chance in
condition B (one-sample t test: t = 5.225, df = 7,
P = 0.001), whereas they failed to reach the significance
threshold in condition C (Wilcoxon: T? = 4, df = 7,
P = 0.109); the monkeys’ choices were at chance level
in conditions A (t = -1.57, df = 7, P = 0.16) and D (t =
-0.52, df = 7, P = 0.619; Fig. 3). Four and three mon-
keys were significantly above chance in conditions B and
C, respectively (binomial test, all Ps B 0.031), but none
was in conditions A and D. The two subjects that had not
participated in Experiment 1 did not perform differently
than the other monkeys: One of the subjects was among the
best-performing individuals and solved condition B sig-
nificantly above chance but marginally failed to pass the
significance threshold in condition C (13 of 18 trials cor-
rect; P = 0.096), while the other subject chose at chance
level in all conditions. Again, the oldest subject performed
at the same level as the other monkeys. The performance of
the monkeys did not change over the course of the six
blocks (all conditions combined: Pearson: r = -0.204,
P = 0.698). Likewise, in none of the conditions, a change
Fig. 3 Performance of the monkeys in Experiment 2. Capital letters
below the x axis denote the conditions. The objects used per condition
are shown below the x axis. The illustration shows the objects after
the hiding of the reward. For conditions B–D, the top object is
rewarded and the lower object is not rewarded. In the control
condition A, each object was rewarded in 50 % of the trials. Boxplots
show median, 25th and 75th quartile, whiskers show 10th and
90th percentiles, dots represent outliers. The solid horizontal line
represents the 50 % chance level, the vertical dotted line separates
control and test conditions. Boxes marked with small letters above the
x axis differ significantly from each other, based on a repeated
measure ANOVA with post hoc Holm–Sidak tests. Asterisk shows
significant deviation from chance according to a one-sample t test
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was observed when comparing the performance in the first
three blocks and the performance in the second three
blocks (paired t test or Wilcoxon, as appropriate: all
Ps C 0.438). Finally, five of the eight monkeys again
revealed significant side biases (binomial tests, all
Ps B 0.024).
Discussion
In this second experiment, the monkeys’ performance
increased relative to the first experiment; a significant
number of individual subjects was able to use the occur-
rence of an inclination of the board to detect the reward. It is
noteworthy that the choice accuracy of the two subjects who
had not participated in Experiment 1 did not deviate from
the accuracy of the other monkeys, suggesting that the
improved performance is not attributable to learning across
experiments. Rather the reduction in complexity allowed
the monkeys to detect the regularities of the task and to be
successful. Under these test conditions we were able to
replicate the original finding of Schmitt et al. (2012), sug-
gesting that long-tailed macaques are able to use the pres-
ence of an inclination to find a reward hidden underneath
this board. Furthermore, the long-tailed macaques seem to
match the performance of the Great Apes, which had been
tested repeatedly in a task in which food was hidden under
one of two boards (similar to condition B; Bra¨uer et al.
2006; Call 2007; Herrmann et al. 2007). However, our
results also suggest that the long-tailed macaques’ abilities
may not go much beyond this level of complexity and may
not be based on elaborate diagnostic reasoning, as the
monkeys were still unable to use the absence of an incli-
nation to infer that that the reward must be hidden under-
neath the cup (condition D). It seems that long-tailed
macaques possess at best a restricted understanding of the
influence of the reward on the orientation of objects, which
may not be extended to hollow objects. Thus, to this point
the monkeys’ success could be based on perceptual pref-
erences, but does not necessarily imply a general under-
standing of the causes of inclined boards. Therefore, in our
next two experiments, we aimed to investigate in more
detail what the subjects understand about the causal rela-
tionships underlying board inclinations.
Experiment 3: inclinations of the same height
When the macaques were confronted with two inclined
boards in Experiment 1, they did not consider the causally
relevant information, that is, which of the boards had
already been inclined before the reward was hidden and
which board had been lying flat. Instead, they tended to
prefer the board with the strongest inclination, which is
similar to the choice strategy employed by bonobos and
gorillas (Call 2007). Two possible explanations for the
monkeys’ failure to detect the baited board exist. First, they
may not attend to temporal information and consequently
do not consider the order in which the boards became
inclined. Second, they may attend to the temporal order,
but a predominant bias towards choosing the board with the
strongest inclination prevented them from using this
information. To test this possibility, we now confronted the
monkeys with two boards of identical inclination.
Methods
Subjects
Seven of the eight subjects (three males) from Experiment
2 participated, while the fourth male was not motivated to
enter the test compartment. In addition, another 4-year old
female was tested (Table 1). This female had participated
previously in the study by Schmitt et al. (2012).
General procedure
The general procedure was identical to Experiments 1
and 2.
Training
The use of the transposition task in Experiment 2 had not
significantly led to a reduction inside biases. Thus, we
abandoned this pre-test and used the choice task from
Experiment 1 instead. Due to an experimenter error, one
monkey received only 10 instead of 12 trials in his first
training session. He nevertheless chose the baited cup
significantly above chance (binomial test: P = 0.021), and
we therefore advanced him to testing.
Testing
In this test, only the boards from Experiment 2 were
presented.
We administered four different conditions:
Hiding food: two boards were presented with one board
resting on a wooden block. The monkeys could observe how
the board was put on the block to ensure that they were aware
that the block caused the inclination of the board. Then the
screen was put up, and a piece of banana of the same size as
the block was shown to the subject and hidden behind the
screen. The experimenter always began to manipulate the
board on the left side and then the board on the right side. The
banana was always hidden under the flat board.
No boards: the wooden block and an equally sized piece
of banana were placed simultaneously on the platform.
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Then the monkeys could choose without the screen having
been put up. This condition was introduced to ensure that
the monkeys’ choices were not explainable by an interest
for the wooden block.
Hidden in view: as ‘‘no boards’’, but now the block and
the banana were simultaneously covered with the two
boards and in full view of the subjects. Then the experi-
menter waited 5 s before the monkeys were allowed to
choose. This condition was introduced to ensure that a non-
preference for the food was not due to memory failures.
Hiding block: as ‘‘hiding food’’ but the banana was first
placed on the platform and covered by the board in full
view of the subjects. The wooden block was then hidden
under the other board behind the screen.
Initially, we planned to run only one session of the
‘‘hiding food’’ condition, consisting of 12 trials; after
having run this session, we decided to incorporate the other
conditions and therefore presented each condition en bloc
within a single session. The first session comprised ‘‘hiding
food’’ trials only and the last session comprised ‘‘hiding
block’’ trials only. The other two conditions were presented
in the second and third session; we randomised the order of
these two conditions for each subject. To avoid satiating
the subjects by providing them with few large pieces of
reward, we reduced the size of the block (and consequently
the size of the reward) to 1.5 cm, which is slightly smaller
than the block presented in Experiment 1.
Due to an experimenter error in 19 of the 24 trials of two
subjects in the ‘‘no boards’’ condition, the subjects could
make their choice without having to wait 5 s. As the per-
formance of the subjects did not differ from the other
subjects, we included them in the analysis. Because of
technical problems, one trial in the ‘‘no boards’’ condition
had to be scored live.
Analysis
Not all data were normally distributed; we consequently
used non-parametric statistics when applicable. A Fried-
man test with the Student–Newman–Keuls (SNK) post hoc
procedure was applied to compare performances between
conditions, and one-sample t tests or Wilcoxon tests were
used to assess if group performances within each condition




Seven subjects reached the training criterion within the first
session. Only one of the females that had already participated
in the previous experiments required a second session.
Test
We found significant performance differences between the
conditions (Friedman: N = 8, v2 = 17.789, df = 3,
P \ 0.001). Post hoc comparisons revealed that the mon-
keys were equally successful in the ‘‘no boards’’ and in the
‘‘hidden in view’’ conditions (SNK: P [ 0.05) and were
more successful in these two than in the other two condi-
tions (SNK: all comparisons Ps \ 0.05). Furthermore, they
were more successful when the block was hidden behind
the screen than when the food was hidden (‘‘hiding block’’
vs. ‘‘hiding food’’, SNK: P \ 0.05; Fig. 4).
As further tests we compared the performance within
each condition against the chance level of 50 %: the
monkeys clearly preferred the banana in all but the ‘‘food
hidden’’ condition (‘‘no boards’’: Wilcoxon: T? = 0,
df = 7, P = 0.008; ‘‘hidden in view’’: Wilcoxon: T? = 0,
df = 7, P = 0.008; ‘‘hiding block’’: paired t test:
t = 4.249, df = 7, P = 0.004; ‘‘hiding food’’: paired t test:
t = 0.753, df = 7, P = 0.476).
On an individual level, all monkeys significantly pre-
ferred the banana in the ‘‘hidden in view’’ condition and
seven of eight subjects did so in the ‘‘no boards’’ condition
(binomial tests: all Ps B 0.039). In contrast, only four of
the eight subjects showed a significant preference for the
banana in the ‘‘hiding block’’ condition and none did so in
the ‘‘hiding food’’ condition.
Four monkeys showed significant side biases in the
‘‘hiding food’’ condition (binomial tests: Ps B 0.039);
three monkeys revealed side biases in the ‘‘hiding block’’
condition (binomial tests: Ps B 0.039), but no side biases
occurred in the ‘‘no boards’’ and the ‘‘hidden in view’’
conditions (binomial test: all Ps C 0.146).
Discussion
The results of this experiment suggest that the monkeys’
failure to distinguish between the two inclined boards in
Experiment 1 was at least not solely due to a preference for
the board with the strongest inclination. Furthermore,
motivational and/or memory effects also cannot account
for these results. Instead, it seems as if the macaques had
difficulties to incorporate temporal information in their
reasoning, that is, to consider (1) that only one board had
changed its inclination after the hiding of the food, and (2)
which of the two boards had changed. At first sight, how-
ever, this interpretation seems to be weakened by the better
performance when the block rather than the food was
hidden behind the screen (condition ‘‘hiding block’’). But a
successful solution of this condition does not require a
comparison of the two boards and the consideration of
temporal information. Instead, the subjects could have
attended to the location of the banana as soon as it had been
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positioned on the board, ignoring the second board. Indeed,
we observed that the monkeys regularly pointed at the
baited board as soon as the banana had been positioned
there and continued to do so until the end of the trial.
Nevertheless, only four of the eight monkeys were con-
sistently successful in this condition, which further sup-
ports the hypothesis that the monkeys had difficulties
attending to the temporal sequence of the events.
Experiment 4: the wedge task
The results of Experiment 2 revealed that the monkeys were
able to use the presence of an inclination to detect the loca-
tion of the reward. The question that remains is whether this
is based on an understanding for the reward causing the
inclination or on a preference for objects with an inclined
surface (Call 2007). To test this, we modified the wedge task
conducted by Call (2007) in which the subjects had to make a
choice between a flat board and a solid wedge.
Methods
Subjects
Seven of the eight subjects (two males) from Experiment 3
participated; the third male had to be removed from the
group for husbandry reasons (Table 1).
General procedure
The general procedure was identical to the ones in the
previous experiments. The experiment was conducted
directly after Experiment 3 without previous training
sessions.
Testing
As objects we used a solid wedge (14 9 11.5 9 2 cm) and
a flat cardboard (13.5 9 11.5 cm); both were covered with
blue tape. On each trial, the wedge and the board were
positioned simultaneously on the platform, with the sloped
side of the wedge facing the subjects. Thereby the wedge
closely resembled an inclined board from the previous
experiments. At the start of the session, the experimenter
repeatedly showed both objects to the subjects from vari-
ous angles to ensure that they were aware of the difference
between the two objects. No food was visible on the plat-
form during the entire trial.
In the original task, a food reward was hidden in a hole
underneath the wedge (Call 2007). However, our subjects
had no experience with such a design. We were interested
in whether the monkeys had an intrinsic preference for the
wedge and did not want to prime them to select it by
rewarding the choice of the wedge only. Therefore, upon
the presentation of both objects, the platform was pushed
forward and the subjects could make their choice. Irre-
spective of the object they chose, the experimenter handed
them a piece of banana after each trial. We ran a single
session with 12 trials.
Results and discussion
The monkeys chose the wedge on 59.5 ± 15.5 % of the
trials (x ± SD; range 50–91.7 %), which did not deviate
significantly from chance (Wilcoxon: T? = 0, df = 6,
P = 0.125). Only one of the subjects had a clear preference
for the wedge (binomial test: P = 0.006; all others:
Ps C 0.774). Even though a statistical analysis is not
possible because of the small sample size, it is noteworthy
that only four of the seven subjects chose the wedge on the
very first trial. Five subjects showed a significant side bias
(binomial tests: Ps B 0.039). Taken together, these results
show that the long-tailed macaques did not have an
intrinsic preference for objects with an inclined surface. In
turn, this finding suggests that the monkeys preferred the
inclined boards in the previous experiments because they
understood that the inclinations had been caused by an
object underneath the board.
General discussion
The present study provides evidence that long-tailed
macaques seem to possess some understanding of causal-
ity, as they were capable of using the inclination of a solid
Fig. 4 Performance of the monkeys in Experiment 3. Boxplots show
median, 25th and 75th quartile, whiskers show 10th and 90th per-
centiles, dots represent outliers. The solid horizontal line represents
the 50 % chance level. Boxes marked with small letters above the
x axis differ significantly from each other, based on a Friedman test
with post hoc SNK-tests. Asterisks show significant deviation from
chance according to a one-sample t test or Wilcoxon test
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cardboard to diagnose the location of hidden food; in
addition, they distinguished between a solid wedge and an
inclined board, which argues against a mere preference for
objects with an inclined surface (Call 2007). However, the
monkeys’ failure in the more complicated settings also
suggests that they did not always appropriately use their
causal knowledge for diagnostic reasoning. The monkeys
neither succeeded when two boards were inclined so that
they needed to exclude one of them based on its inclination
prior to the hiding, nor when they had to use the absence of
an inclination of a board to infer that the reward must have
been hidden underneath a different object.
Consequently, long-tailed macaques seem to possess at
least some knowledge about the influence of solid objects
such as the reward on flat objects like boards. Moreover,
the lack of preference for the wedge in Experiment 4
suggests that the monkeys may have preferred the inclined
board in the other experiments because only this object, but
not the wedge, was a possible hiding place. Importantly,
causal understanding and learning are often regarded as
opposing mechanisms. However, this does not need to be
the case. The observation of a reward underneath the
inclined board may have highlighted the cause of the
inclination, facilitating the rapid acquisition of an, albeit
restricted, folk-physical understanding for object–object
relations. This would also be in line with the findings of a
recent study on chimpanzees, showing that these apes learn
a discrimination based on causal features very quickly,
whereas they did not learn an arbitrary discrimination
within thrice as many trials (Hanus and Call 2011).
However, it is obvious that long-tailed macaques’ abil-
ities are restricted, as they failed to detect the reward
underneath the cup. Is this deficit attributable to a failure of
understanding of the presented causal relations or a partial
failure of reasoning diagnostically? A lack of causal
understanding would imply that the monkeys were not
aware that the reward could have been hidden underneath
the cup and thus may not understand ‘‘hollowness’’. It is
true that monkeys have been reported repeatedly to have
problems with invisible displacements in object perma-
nence tasks, that is, they often fail to track objects that had
been hidden repeatedly under a series of objects (e.g., de
Blois and Novak 1994; de Blois et al. 1998; Mathieu et al.
1976). However, this finding is not universal (e.g., Nei-
worth et al. 2003), and it is unclear how to interpret failures
in invisible displacement tasks (reviewed by Gomez 2005).
Furthermore, our subjects succeeded in invisible displace-
ment tasks, even though they committed a relatively large
number of errors (Schmitt et al. 2012). In addition, our
monkeys had ample experience with food hidden under-
neath various types of cups or bowls in the course of this
project as well as other investigations (e.g., Schmitt and
Fischer 2009, 2011; Schmitt et al. 2012) and also mastered
the transposition task used during training for Experiment
2. To acquire this competency, they required a considerable
amount of training. This finding is in concordance with a
study by Amici et al. (2010), who also found that long-
tailed macaques master single transpositions, even though
they are error-prone. Taken together, it seems safe to
assume that our subjects knew that food can be hidden
underneath a cup and were generally able to track the
hiding of a reward. Thus, a more likely possibility is that
the long-tailed macaques failed, at least in this specific
context, to integrate their knowledge about object–object
interactions into a correct diagnostic inference. This failure
in complex situations need not necessarily imply that they
do not reason diagnostically in less complex contexts. The
work by Baillargeon and co-workers showed that human
infants’ physical knowledge develops gradually (e.g.,
Baillargeon 1995, 2004) so that the cognitive skills of
monkeys may be similarly restricted to certain domains or
contexts. An example of such a restriction in a different
task are capuchin monkeys who do not demonstrate
exclusion abilities across all contexts, but only in restricted
cases (Heimbauer et al. 2012; Paukner et al. 2006, 2009;
Sabbatini and Visalberghi 2008).
Our task involved two steps of inference, and there is
evidence that several species successfully solve one step,
but fail with two-step inferences. For instance, in the most
commonly used reasoning paradigms, subjects are con-
fronted with a choice between two bowls, one of which is
baited. Before the subjects make their choice, the empty
bowl is lifted to inform them about the absence of the food
(e.g., Call 2004; see Hampton et al. 2004; Paukner et al.
2006 for a related paradigm involving tubes instead of
bowls). In this case, the solution is straightforward and
only one inference is required: The animals perceive
directly that the food is absent in one location and need to
deduce that the food is probably in the alternative loca-
tion.1 This task is solved by a variety of species from apes
(Bra¨uer et al. 2006; Call 2004; Hill et al. 2011) to monkeys
(Hill et al. 2011; Paukner et al. 2009; Sabbatini and
Visalberghi 2008; Schmitt and Fischer 2009), dogs (Canis
familiaris) (Erdo¨hegyi et al. 2007) and birds (Mikolasch
et al. 2012; Schloegl et al. 2009b). Some species have also
been tested in a transfer task in which they do not see but
can only hear which bowl is empty: The bowls are shaken
before the animals can make their choice and the shaking
of the baited, but not of the empty bowl causes a rattling
noise. Thus, a two-step inference is required: when only the
empty bowl is shaken, they first have to infer that the lack
1 Because of this straightforwardness, it is heavily disputed if this
task provides any evidence for reasoning. Instead, it may be solved
through avoidance of the empty bowl alone (e.g., Paukner et al. 2009;
Schloegl et al. 2009a; Schmitt and Fischer 2009).
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of noise indicates the absence of the reward in this bowl,
and the second inference requires them to realise that
because of the absence of the food the reward must be
hidden in the other bowl. Interestingly, this task has so far
been solved successfully and without previous training
only by apes (Call 2004; Hill et al. 2011) and Grey parrots
(Schloegl et al. 2012), whereas all monkeys failed
(Heimbauer et al. 2012; Paukner et al. 2009; Schmitt and
Fischer 2009) or needed extensive training (Sabbatini and
Visalberghi 2008). Analogous to this task, the long-tailed
macaques in our experiment first needed to infer that the
reward cannot be hidden underneath the flat board and
second that therefore the reward must be under the cup.
The concept of diagnostic uncertainty (Fernbach et al.
2012) may help to explain the difficulties of the monkeys
upon seeing two inclined boards. In the experiments of
Fernbach and colleagues, human children were confronted
with a box that began to play music if a wooden block was
placed on top of it. In one condition, each of two dark
blocks activated the machine, whereas a white block did
not. After the machine had started to play music behind an
occluder, the children were asked which of the blocks had
caused its activation. Three- and four-year-old children
master this task; when they were told that the black block
they had picked did not activate the machine, they could
correct themselves and select the other black block. Fern-
bach et al. (2012) refer to this competency as first-order
diagnostic uncertainty, meaning that the subject needs to
understand that more than one possible solution exists. Our
experiment presented a task with lower complexity than
this task, but it also provided a certain level of uncertainty:
When confronted with two inclined boards, the possibility
existed that under the previously inclined board an addi-
tional piece of food could have been hidden. In other
words, whereas the newly inclined board was the most
likely location of the reward, the previously inclined board
was another possible location (see also Bra¨uer et al. 2006,
Call 2007 and Seed et al. 2012 for a similar argument).
Thus, this uncertainty may have contributed to the low
performance in the conditions in which the monkeys had
the choice between two inclined boards. Importantly, the
same uncertainty also applies to the condition in which
they had to choose between a newly inclined board and the
cup (condition C of Experiment 2); indeed, the perfor-
mance in this condition was worse than in the condition
without any uncertainty, that is, in the condition in which
one board was inclined and the other board remained flat.
Nevertheless, the difference between these two conditions
is not very strong, and it remains speculative whether the
monkeys’ performance can be explained by sensitivity to
diagnostic uncertainty.
Interestingly, the monkeys performed similarly to the
Great apes (Bra¨uer et al. 2006; Call 2007). Apes also
exhibit a preference for inclined boards. However, both
apes and monkeys do not have a general preference for
objects with inclined surfaces (e.g., wedges). Interestingly,
the monkeys chose the inclined board even though they had
not seen the process of inclining because the hiding of the
reward was conducted behind a screen. This is again in
concordance with the results obtained with the Great apes,
but in contrast to the performance of dogs (Bra¨uer et al.
2006). Dogs preferred the inclined board only if they had
seen it inclining (but without observing that a food reward
caused the inclination). This led the authors to suggest that
in contrast to apes, dogs lack an understanding of the
underlying causal relations but were subject to enhance-
ment effects instead (Bra¨uer et al. 2006). To our knowl-
edge, no previous study has yet employed our test
paradigm in which the subjects have to choose between a
(flat or inclined) board and a cup. We can make clear and
testable predictions how other species and in particular
apes should perform. If we are correct with our hypothesis
that the monkeys’ failure to infer the location of the reward
underneath the cup is due to an inability to conduct two-
step reasoning operations, the apes should master this task.
This hypothesis is based on the successful performance of
apes, but not monkeys, in the shaking experiment described
above, which may also be based on two-step inferences
(Call 2004; Heimbauer et al. 2012; Paukner et al. 2009;
Schmitt and Fischer 2009; but see Seed et al. 2012 for
failures of some apes in a different task).
Finally, a critic may argue that the monkeys may have
responded to subtle experimenter-provided cues. This,
however, cannot explain why only two subjects selected
the single inclined board in the first experiment (conditions
C and D). From the previous study by Schmitt et al. (2012),
it is already known that monkeys prefer inclined boards
and thus it is obvious that the experimenter expected the
monkeys to succeed in these conditions. Similarly, we had
expected that the monkeys would be more successful
throughout the study, but they apparently were not. Thus,
unintended cueing seems highly unlikely to explain the
subjects’ performances.
In summary, our results demonstrate that long-tailed
macaques seem to possess an at least restricted under-
standing of the causal influence objects can have on the
spatial orientation of other covering objects. They fail,
however, to adequately incorporate this knowledge in
complex diagnostic reasoning that requires two-step
inferences.
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